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Abstract 
 
 This article investigates the impact of different emotions on trust decisions taking 
the experience of betrayal into account. Thus, an experiment was created which included 
one betrayal group and one control group.  Participants in the betrayal group experienced 
more intense feelings governed by negative emotions than participants in the control 
group did.  Moreover, participants in the betrayal group significantly lowered their trusts 
in another stranger.  In addition, our results indicated that the feeling of shame in 
connection with an experienced betrayal was linked to an individual’s lowering of his or 
her subsequent trust levels. On the other hand, we found some evidence that emotional 
intelligence (the use-of-emotions) attenuated the relationship between experienced 
betrayal and subsequent trust whereas neuroticism exaggerated this relationship.   
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1. Introduction 
Trust has received considerable interests from academia and business in the last two 
decades.  There are many reasons for this since trust has been observed to be connected 
with many positive processes and outcomes.  Gargiulo and Ertug (2006) have 
summarized the benefits of trust in an organization under three broad headings.  First, 
trust can reduce the cost of monitoring and thus the number of safeguards.  Second, trust 
can reinforce commitment in a relationship.  Third, trust can lead to more open 
communication and to a richer exchange of resources among people.  Although these 
benefits from trust are appealing, it is never easy for one person to trust another because 
of the vulnerability involved.  Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman (1995) have defined trust as 
a person’s willingness to be vulnerable to the actions of another party based on the 
expectation that the other party will respond according to the former’s anticipation.  In 
other words, trusting another person may open the possibility of being exploited by the 
latter party.   Reduction in the number of safeguards may invite intrusions and over-
commitment in a relationship that may lead to groupthink.  Also, a richer exhange of 
resources may give rise to the misappropriation of sensitive information.  Therefore, it is 
not unusual that people constantly struggle to strike a balance between trust and distrust. 
This struggle is particularly intense when one faces a stranger.  This is because 
there is no track record concerning the target’s trustworthiness which a person can rely on 
to form his or her judgment.  In this paper we attempt to demonstrate that emotion plays a 
part in an individual’s trust in a stranger.  More specifically, we argue that an experience 
of betrayal, which is likely to generate negative emotions, may significantly affect an 
individual’s subsequent trust in another stranger.  In addition, we try to show that some 
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negative emotions are more likely than others in the association with the subsequent 
change in trust decisions.  Nonetheless, we also suggest that a person’s ability or 
tendency to deal with emotions can make a difference in how an experience of betrayal 
impacts on one’s subsequent trust in a stranger.     
Emotions and Initial Trust 
There has been evidence showing that a person’s emotional state is likely to influence his 
or her judgment relating to trust.  Forgas and East (2008) have revealed that a person’s 
suspicion of a stranger is affected by the mood he or she experiences.  When asked to 
judge whether a stranger had committed a theft and denied the incident, sad participants 
were more likely than neutral and happy participants to give guilt judgments and less 
likely to give honesty judgments.   Dunn and Schweitzer (2005) have found that a 
person’s emotional state can affect his or her trust in a stranger.  They recruited 
participants at a railway station and asked them to undergo an emotion induction exercise 
which induced anger, sadness and happiness respectively by describing a past incident.  
Then the participants were asked to rate the trustworthiness of a previously identified 
unfamiliar co-worker.  The results showed that participants in the happy condition were 
more trusting than those in the sad and angry conditions. 
Betrayal and Negative Emotions 
The studies above have demonstrated that moods and emotions aroused from unrelated 
events affect a person’s trust in a stranger.  We thus propose that feelings aroused from a 
trust-related event – a betrayal – may have a striking effect on an individual’s trust in a 
stranger.  We adopt Elangovan and Shapiro’s (1998) definition of betrayal, which 
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describes betrayal as a violation of pivotal expectations of a trustor.  Lazare (2004) has 
provided insights into the feelings he experienced once when he was betrayed: 
“Two friends betrayed my trust over an important matter.  Their lying about it 
only compounded my hurt.   For weeks after this discovery, I was distraught and 
distracted from my daily activities… I began to question both my trusting 
approach to relationships and my overall ability to judge people” (p.16).   
From the description above, two consequences arising from the incident of 
betrayal can be identified.  First, there was an emotional impact: the author felt hurt and 
distraught.  Second, he questioned his trusting approach and ability to judge people.   
Events that harm an individual’s welfare are likely to cause negative emotions 
(Frijda, 1988) and betrayal is likely to be one of these.  The fact that betrayal can cause 
negative emotions has been reported in a number of studies.  First, a violation of a 
psychological contract can be viewed as one form of betrayal because it comprises both 
the element of trust and the expectation that another party will fulfil his or her obligations 
(Rousseau, 1989; Robinson, 1996; Elangovan & Shapiro, 1998).  Robinson and Morrison 
(2000) have discovered that when a person sees the purposeful breach of a psychological 
contract by another party under unfair conditions,  he or she will experience strong 
feelings of violation.   Second, Koehler and Gershoff (2003) have discovered that people 
reported intense negative feelings toward the manufacturer of a safety product that caused 
the harm it was claimed to protect them from.  Other experimental studies have also 
revealed that betrayal is linked to negative emotions (Schweitzer, Hershey, & Bradlow, 
2006; Lount, Zhong, Sivanathan, & Murnighan, 2008) 
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Feelings aroused from betrayal normally involve a number of negative emotions.  
First, when we are betrayed, most of us may feel disappointed or upset because the other 
party failed to meet one’s expectation (Robinson, Dirks, & Ozcelik, 2004).  Second, 
anger is also aroused because of the disappointment due to the unfairness (Ekman, 2007).  
Third, a person may also encounter shame when betrayed because he or she thinks that 
his or her trust has been exploited (Robinson et al., 2004; Piper & Monin, 2006; Vohs, 
Baumeister, & Chin, 2007).   Therefore, our first hypothesis may be stated as follows: 
H1:  An experience of betrayal will associate with negative emotions such as 
upset, anger and shame. 
Betrayal and Subsequent Trust in Other Strangers 
As  Lazare (2004) recounted that his betrayal incident led to the questioning of his 
trusting approach, we postuale that a betrayal may affect a person’s subsequent trust in 
other strangers.  There has been evidence suggesting that once a trust is violated, it will 
be very difficult for a person to restore his or her level of trust before the violation 
(Bottom, Gibson, Daniels, & Murnighan, 2002; Schweitzer et al., 2006; Lount et al., 
2008).  Many of these studies investigated the effect of betrayal on subsequent trust on 
the same person.  Nonetheless, we argue that the negative effect of betrayal on 
subsequent trust will also apply to other unrelated persons for two reasons. First, painful 
experience has been linked to counterfactual thoughts (Miller & Taylor, 2002).  
Counterfactual thoughts mean that a betrayed person may think that he or she would have 
not been in such dire situation if only he or she had not been trusting too much.  Second, 
the effect on subsequent trust is partly due to the emotions aroused by the betrayal. 
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It has been recognized that the emotion system serves as an important 
motivational system (Smith & Kirby, 2001).  Emotions arouse, sustain, and direct human 
actions (Salovey, Bedell, Detweiler, & Mayer, 2000) and shift a person’s attention to 
critical features of his or her environment (Forgas, 2001; Leary, 2004).  Under some 
circumstances, emotions also signal the need for changing one’s tendency (Frijda, 1988).  
Negative emotions, in particular, convey information to individuals about the current 
situation.  For example, dissatisfaction and disappointment inform a person that the 
maintenance of current behavior or decision is not justified  (Rothman, Baldwin, & 
Hertel, 2004). 
Empirical evidence has shown that negative emotions have an impact on 
decisions and judgments.  Luce (1989) has reported that when a person is over-whelmed 
by negative emotions, he or she tends to refrain from making decisions.  In the case of 
betrayal, this means that a person will defer the decision to trust another person whenever 
possible.  Forgas and East (2008) have found that those who were infused with negative 
mood are more inclined to judge a target person guilty of an offense.   This implies that 
negative affective state may arouse suspicion.  Therefore, our second hypothesis states 
the following: 
H2: An experience of betrayal will lower a person’s subsequent trust in a stranger. 
Self-conscious Emotions and Subsequent Trust 
Nonetheless, not all kinds of negative emotions will associate with a person’s 
lowering of subsequent trust in a stranger.   In effect, we argue that only those negative 
emotions which lead a person to think of himself or herself will be linked to a subsequent 
drop in trusting others.  In other words, only when a person experiences self-conscious 
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emotions will he or she adjust to their trusting stance.  It has been recognized that the 
feeling of shame belongs to self-conscious emotions whereas other feelings such as anger 
and sadness do not. 
The feeling of shame makes a person focus on the total self (Lewis, 2000).  
Shame afflicts one’s self-esteem and leads one to an evaluation of one’s worth as a 
person (Brown & Marshall, 2001).  Hong and Bohnet (2007) have found that people who 
are typically considered as having high status tend to avoid betrayals and are less 
concerned about benefits from trust.  This may be because compared to low status people, 
high status people are more likely to feel shame when they are betrayed.  In other words, 
people who feel shame tend to blame themselves for causing the problem.   
On the other hand, anger prompts a person to blame someone else for the 
undesirable situation (Wranik, Barrett, & Salovey, 2007) and to plan for revenge 
(Johnson-Laird & Oatley, 2000).  In a Power-to-Take Game where player 1 can claim 
any part of player 2’s resources, and player 2 can react by destroying some of these 
resources, it has been found that player 2 is more likely to punish player 1 by destroying 
the resources if anger is experienced by player 2 (Ben-Shakhar, Bornstein, Hopfensitz, & 
Winden, 2007).  Similarly, upset makes a person feel helpless in an undesirable situation 
where there is little hope of improvement (Wranik et al., 2007).  However, it does not 
necessarily lead a person to blame himself or herself.  Therefore, our third hypothesis 
states the following: 
H3: Shame is the main negative feeling that associates with an individual’s 
subsequent change in his or her trust in strangers after encountering a betrayal.  
Individual Differences in Self-Regulation 
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However, while we postulate that an experience of betrayal in general will 
negatively affect a person’s subsequent trust in strangers, we still argue that there may 
exist individual differences in the reaction to betrayal.  Parrot and Spackman (2000) have 
contended that a person’s emotional state at the time of retrieving can redefine an event.  
People who are better at regulating emotions or who are less vulnerable to negatvie 
emotions are more likely than others to maintain the same level of trust in strangers.  
Thus, we try to discuss how emotional intelligence (EI) and neuroticism can moderate the 
relationship between an experience of betrayal and subsequent trust in strangers. 
Emotional Intelligence 
As defined by Mayer and Salovey (1997), EI involves four abilities: (1) the ability to 
accurately perceive and express emotions of self and others; (2) the ability to generate 
feelings to assist thinking; (3) the ability to understand emotions and their progression; 
and (4) the ability to regulate and manage emotions.  It has been argued that high-EI 
individuals are capable of reasoning accurately about their own emotions (Mayer, 
Salovey, & Caruso, 2008).  This is because emotions are processed through both the 
associative processing system, which is automatic, and the reasoning system, which is 
deliberate (Smith & Kirby, 2001).   The abilities to use, understand, and regulate 
emotions belong to the latter system (Pellitteri, 2002; Mayer et al., 2008).  In other words, 
high-EI individuals are more likely to maintain their autonomy over their behaviors and 
judgments in the presence of emotions.  Brackett, Mayer, and Warner (2004) have also 
reported that lower EI males are more likely to exhibit deviant behaviors, such as fighting 
with others and having poor relations with friends.   Another empirical study has shown 
that emotional intelligence is inversely related to irrationality (Spörrle & Welpe, 2006). 
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Consequently, researchers have proposed that high-EI individuals should be able 
to distinguish between helpful and unhelpful emotions and emotionally charged thoughts 
(Ciarrochi & Blackledge, 2006).  They are able to alter their emotions so that undesired 
emotional influences on judgment are minimized (Law, Wong, Huang, & Li, 2008).  
They are more likely to recover from failures because of the ability to use emotion and 
the ability to regulate emotions (Boss & Sims, 2008).   The ability to use emotions 
enables an individual to use helpful emotions to enhance performance. At the same time, 
the ability to regulate emotions enables an individual to moderate the negative emotions 
without exaggerating or minimizing the information they convey (Mayer & Salovey, 
1997).  The dual process of both allocating attention to processing information about the 
failure and restricting the negative emotion from imparing the information processing 
capacity will help to speed up the recovery from failure (Shepherd, 2003).  Since a 
betrayal can be regarded as one form of failure, that is, a mistake in trusting the wrong 
person, we propose the following hypothesis:  
H4:  Individuals’ EI will attenuate the interaction between an experienced 
betrayal and one’s subsequent change in trusting strangers. 
Neuroticism 
Contrary to emotional intelligence, neuroticism normally associates with the 
inability to handle emotions.  Neuroticism is one of the five domains in the Big-Five 
Personality Model and one of the three personality factors in Eysenck’s trait theory 
(Eysenck, 2000). It is normally related to emotional instability (Benet-Martinez & John, 
1998; Goldberg, 1990).  People who are high in neuroticism are normally regarded as 
moody, touchy, irritable, anxious, unstable, pessimistic, and complaining (Larsen & Buss, 
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2002). They are constantly in a tense state while those who are low in neuroticism are 
comparatively more relaxed (Eysenck, 2000).  Previous studies have reported that 
neuroticism is negatively correlated with emotional intelligence (Law, Wong, & Song, 
2004; Zeidner, Roberts, & Matthews, 2008) and negative mood repair (Ng & Diener, 
2009). 
People high in neuroticism are less likely to believe that their emotions can be 
changed and more likely to believe that their own emotions are too strong to be 
controlled (Gross & John, 1998; John & Gross, 2007).  They react more strongly to 
negative stimuli (Ng & Diener, 2009) and are particularly vulnerable to emotional change 
induced by events (Matthews, Emo, Funke, Zeidner, Roberts, & Costa, 2006).  They tend 
to adopt problematic coping strategies like wishful thinking, withdrawal and emotion-
focused coping (Connor-Smith & Flachsbart, 2007; Matthews et al., 2006).  People high 
in neuroticism also have less tolerance for negative situations than people low in 
neuroticism (Wong, Yik, & Kwong, 2006).  As a result, they are less likely to stick with 
the same course of action that generates negative emotions.  In terms of betrayal and trust, 
we predict that people high in neuroticism will exaggerate the implication of a betrayal 
experience and will be more likely to switch to a more conservative approach to strangers.  
Therefore, our final hypothesis states the following: 
H5:  Individuals’ neuroticism tendency will exaggerate the interaction between an 
experienced betrayal and one’s subsequent change in trusting strangers. 
Method 
We conducted an experiment which contained one betrayal group and one control group.  
Two days before the experiment, we collected information pertaining to participants’ 
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emotional intelligence, neuroticism scores, and other issues.   During the experiment, we 
assessed participants’ trust decisions by using both behavioral and survey measures.  The 
intensity of various experienced emotions was also studied. In addition, a manipulation 
check was conducted. Moreover, data from different demographics variables were 
collected. 
Participants 
Eighty-three business school students from the Norwegian School of Economics 
and Business Administrations were recruited as participants.  They were provided with 
the role of trustor in two different experimental conditions.   38.6 percent of the 
participants were female and 61.4 percent were male.  Their average age was 23.0 years.  
Forty participants were included in the betrayal group and the other forty-three were 
included in the control group.   
Materials 
 Trust Game 
 The trust game used implies that a trustor has Kr.40 (about 7 US dollars) on hand.  
Whatever amount the trustor decides to give to the trustee, the amount would be 
multiplied by four.  The trustee, on the other hand, could decide to choose whether he or 
she would give half of the multiplied amount back to the trustor, or simply take the whole 
multiplied amount for himself/herself.   
 In the trust game, the rational choice for the trustee is to take the whole multiplied 
amount for himself/herself, as long as he or she is maximizing the monetary payoff.  
Knowing the rational choice of the trustee, the rational choice for the trustor will be to 
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keep the entire original amount and give the trustee nothing.  However, trust arises if the 
trustor is willing to give any amount greater than zero. 
 Measures of Trust 
 Both a behavioral measure and a survey measure of trust were used at each of the 
two games.  The behavioral measure was the amount sent by the participants in the trust 
game.  The survey measure asked the participants to rate the following question: “I really 
trusted her to share half of the amount with me” using a 7-point Likert-type scale (from 
strongly disagree to strongly agree).  Since the standardized coefficient alphas for the two 
measures of trust were .73 in game 1 and .81 in game 2 respectively, we formulated a 
composite measure of trust by combining the standardized scores of the behavioral 
measure and the survey measure in both games. 
 Negative Emotions 
Three negative emotions – anger, shame, and upset – were measured using a 5-
point scale based on the PANAS scale (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988).  The scale 
includes the attributes “very slightly or not at all”, “a little”, “moderately”, “quite a bit”, 
and “extremely”.  In addition to individual emotions, we also combined the three 
emotions into a measure of averaged negative emotions.  The coefficient alpha for the 
averaged negative emotions for our sample was .76 
 Emotional Intelligence 
 We adopted the 16-item Wong and Law EI scale (WLEIS) of emotional 
intelligence (Law et al., 2004) by using 5-point Likert-type scales (from strongly disagree 
to strongly agree).  This EI scale shares the four elements of EI proposed by Mayer & 
Salovey (1997) and is also classified as an ability model (Law et al., 2004).  The 
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coefficient alpha for our sample was found to be .72  and the coefficient alphas for our 
sample for each of the subscales were as follows: awareness of others’ emotions, .75; 
emotion regulation, .74; awareness of own emotions, .76; and use of emotion, .76. 
 Neuroticism 
 We adopted the BFI-44 to measure the neuroticism of participants (which was 
reprinted in Benet-Martinez & John, 1998).  We extracted the nine items which measure 
neuroticism by using 5-point Likert-type scales (from strongly disagree to strongly agree).  
The coefficient alpha for our sample was found to be .72. 
 Manipulation Check 
 This is a single item measure that asked the participants the following question: “I 
felt betrayed by the person in the game” using a 7-point Likert-type scale (from strongly 
disagree to strongly agree).   
Procedure 
 Eighty-three participants were first asked to fill in an online questionnaire which 
assessed their emotional intelligence, neuroticism, and other unrelated questions.  Two 
days later, each of them was e-mailed a unique password to participate in an online 
experiment which was set through the online program, Surveygizmo.  The password 
could only be used once.  This ensured that no one would participate in the experiment 
more than once.  Also, the program restricted the participants to being able to go forward 
to the next page and not being able to backtrack to the pages they had visited before. 
 The participants were then introduced to how to play the trust game.  They were 
given two trial games so that they were familiar with the rules.  After each trial game, the 
calculation of payoffs under the conditions of honest and dishonest trustee was shown to 
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them based on their choice of amount.  After the trial games, they were automatically 
assigned to the betrayal group or the control group but they were not informed which 
group they were in.  Forty participants were assigned to the betrayal group and forty three 
participants to the control group. 
 Betrayal Group 
 Participants in the betrayal group were first presented with a photo of a trustee.  
The trustee was an exchange student in the previous academic year.  In the photo she was 
about to write down whether she would be willing to share half of the multiplied amounts, 
in case a trustor decides to give her some amount.  In the description the participants 
were told that the person in the photo agreed to share half of the multiplied amount with 
them.  They were asked to decide on the amount (Kr. 0; Kr.10; Kr.20; Kr.30; Kr.40) they 
would give her (the behavioral measure of trust).  They were also asked whether they 
knew her name, had talked with her, or worked with her before.  They were also asked to 
fill in the survey measure of trust at the same time.   
 On the next page, the photo that displayed the answer actually written down by 
the trustee was shown to them.  The answer was that she took the whole multiplied 
amount herself and did not want to share with the participants.  
Then on the next page participants were asked to play a second trust game.  They 
were presented with another photo of a trustee who was about to write down her choice.  
This second trustee was another exchange student in the previous academic year.  The 
same descriptions and questions were presented to the participants as in the first trust 
game. On the next page, the photo that displayed the answer actually written down by the 
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second trustee was shown to them.  The answer was that she did agree to share half of the 
multiplied amount with the participants.  
 At the end of two trust games, we asked participants about the emotions they 
experienced at the time just before they started the second game.  Having asked this 
question earlier might have interfered with the emotional effects (Forgas & East, 2008).  
They were also asked to fill in the manipulation-check question. 
 Control Group 
 In the control group, the same procedure was applied as it was done in the 
betrayal group except that the answer of the first game was not shown to the participants 
before they played the second game.  In other words, participants did not know the 
answer of the first trustee when they played against the second trustee.  All the measures 
were the same. 
 For both groups, other information such as age and gender was collected at the 
end.   
Results 
 
Manipulation Check 
 
 We first conducted an independent-samples t-test on the mean scores of feeling of 
betrayal between the betrayal group and the control group.  Participants in the betrayal 
group experienced a significantly stronger feeling of betrayal (M = 5.38, SD = 1.48) than 
those in the control group (M = 2.60, SD = 1.20; t(81) = 9.61,  p < .001). The results 
confirmed that our manipulation successfully produced a sense of betrayal in the betrayal 
group. 
Hypotheses 
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 Hypothesis 1 stated that an experience of betrayal will associate with negative 
emotions.  An independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare the averaged 
negative emotions experienced by the two groups.   There was a significant difference in 
the scores for the betrayal group (M = 2.17, SD = .83) and the control group (M = 1.29, 
SD = .58; t(69) = -5.57, p < .001).  In other words, the participants in the betrayal group 
experienced more negative emotions on average than did the participants in the control 
group.  Therefore, Hypothesis 1 was supported. 
Hypotheses 2 proposed that an experience of betrayal will lower a person’s 
subsequent trust in a stranger.  A two-factor mixed between-within subjects analysis of 
variance was conducted to assess the impact of betrayal on participants’ composite trust 
in two trustees.  We discovered that there was a significant interaction between group and 
trust, Wilks Lambda = .92, F (1, 81) = 6.64, p < .05.  Hypothesis 2 was thus supported.  
For trust-rating, the mean in the betrayal group dropped from 5.27 (SD = 1.06) in the first 
game to 4.70 (SD = 1.09) in the second game, whereas in the control group it dropped 
only from 5.00 (SD = 1.59) to 4.93 (SD = 1.47).  For amount-sent, the mean in the 
betrayal group dropped from 33.50 (SD = 8.93) in the first game to 28.00 (SD = 13.44) in 
the second game, whereas in the control group it dropped only from 31.40 (SD = 11.46) 
to 29.77 (SD = 11.85).  
Before the testing of Hypothesis 3, we refer to Table 1 to see how participants 
changed their subsequent trust taking into account the betrayal group and the control 
group.  First, it shows that more participants in the betrayal group decreased their 
subsequent trust, both in terms of trust-rating and the amount sent.  Second, no one in the 
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betrayal group increased their subsequent trust as some did in the control group, both in 
terms of trust-rating and the amount sent. 
Table 1 about here 
Hypothesis 3 stated that shame is the main negative feeling that associates with an 
individual’s  subsequent change in his or her trust in strangers after encountering a 
betrayal.  Since Table 1 shows that in the betrayal group participants either lowered their 
subsequent trust or remained at the same level of trust, we organized participants in the 
betrayal group in two categories: drop or remain.  These two categories were treated as 
the dependent variable and each of the negative emotions was treated as the independent 
variable in separate logistic regression.   
We first ran a logistic regression analysis in order to assess the impact of shame 
on the likelihood that participants would lower their trust-rating of another person in the 
betrayal group.   The model was statistically significant, χ2 (1, N = 40) = 5.53, p < .05, 
indicating that it was able to distinguish between who lowered his or her trust-rating in 
another person after betrayal and who did not.  The model as a whole explained between 
12.9% (Cox and Snell R square) and 17.4% (Nagelkerke R Square) of the variance in the 
change in trust and correctly classified 72.5% of the cases.  The feeling of shame made a 
statistically significant contribution.  The odd ratio was 2.11, which indicated that 
participants were over twice as much likely to lower their trust-rating in the second 
trustee for every unit increase of shame reported. 
Separate logistic regression analysis, nonetheless, showed that the model was not 
significant when the feeling of being upset (χ2 (1, N = 40) = 0.04, p =.85) or angry (χ2 (1, 
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N = 40) = 1.75, p =.19) was used as independent variable respectively.  We therefore 
concluded that Hypothesis c was supported for the survey measure of trust.  
In terms of the behavioral measure of trust, a logistic regression showed that the 
model in which shame was the independent variable was statistically significant, χ2 (1, N 
= 40) = 5.00, p < .05.  The model as a whole explained between 11.7% (Cox and Snell R 
square) and 16.0% (Nagelkerke R Square) of the variance in the change in trust and 
correctly classified 72.5% of cases.  The odd ratio was 2.02, which indicated that 
participants were over twice as much likely to lower their amount-sent in the second 
trustee for every unit increase of shame reported. 
Similarly, separate logistic regression analysis, nonetheless, showed that the 
model was not significant when the feeling of being upset (χ2 (1, N = 40) = 0.04, p =.85) 
or angry (χ2 (1, N = 40) = 1.20, p =.27) was used as independent variable respectively.  
We therefore concluded that Hypothesis 3 was also supported for the behavioral measure 
of trust.  
For Hypotheses 4 and 5, we tested whether the additional factors, emotional 
intelligence and neuroticism, would moderate the interaction between betrayal and two 
trust decisions.  In other words, we performed a three-factor mixed between-within 
subjects analysis of variance for each of the additional factors.  Hypothesis 4 asserted that 
high-EI individuals would attenuate the interaction effect between an experienced 
betrayal and one’s subsequent trust decisions.  A couple of three-factor mixed between-
within subjects ANOVAs were performed to investigate whether each component of EI 
(continuous) or the overall EI (continuous) moderated the interaction between group 
(betrayal, control) and composite trust (game 1, game 2). The only marginally significant 
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component was the use-of-emotion, Wilks Lambda = .94, F (2, 79) = 2.64, p = .08.  It 
meant that use-of-emotions moderated the interaction term group x composite trust. 
When we separated the trust measures, we found that the use-of-emotion (continuous) 
significantly moderated the interaction between group (betrayal, control) and trust-rating, 
Wilks Lambda = .92, F (2, 79) = 3.40, p < .05, but not amount-sent, Wilks Lambda = .96, 
F (2, 79) = 1.48, p = .23.  Figure 1 depicted the change in trust-rating in each group 
(betrayal, control) across three categories of use-of-emotion (high, middle, and low).  It 
showed that in the betrayal group trust-rating tended to decrease less as the use-of-
emotion scores increased.  In other words, the use-of-emotions attenuated the impact of 
betrayal on trust-rating.  Therefore, Hypothesis 4 was marginally supported. 
Figure 1 about here 
Hypothesis 5 postulated that individuals who scored high in neuroticism will 
exaggerate the impact of an experienced betrayal and one’s subsequent change in trusting 
strangers.  A three-factor mixed between-within subjects ANOVA was performed to 
investigate whether neuroticism (continuous) moderated the interaction between group 
(betrayal, control) and composite (game 1, game 2).  The interaction between neuroticism 
x group x trust-rating turned out to be marginally significant, Wilks Lambda = .93, F (2, 
77) = 3.07, p = .05.  When we separated the measures of trust, we found that neuroticism 
(continuous) significantly moderated the interaction between group (betrayal, control) 
and trust-rating, Wilks Lambda = .89, F (2, 77) = 4.57, p < .05, but not amount-sent, 
Wilks Lambda = .95, F (2, 77) = 1.96, p = .15.  Figure 2 depicted the change in trust-
rating in each group (betrayal, control) across three categories of neuroticism (high, 
middle, and low).  It showed that trust-rating in the betrayal group tended to increase 
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sharply for those who score very high in neuroticism. In other words, neuroticism 
exaggerated the impact of betrayal on trust-rating.  Hypothesis 5 was thus partially 
supported.   
Figure 2 about here 
Discussion 
Our results demonstrated that an experience of betrayal associates with negative emotions 
such as anger, upset and shame.  This confirms the results of a previous study indicating 
that betrayal gives rise to negative emotions (Koehler & Gershoff, 2003).  Moreover, the 
suggestion that tactics aimed at reducing negative emotions may be more effective in 
restoration of trust (Schweitzer et al., 2006) may find some support from our results.  
Our results also provided empirical evidence to support the claims that an incident 
of betrayal by a stranger will affect a person’s willingness to trust in another stranger 
(Bohnet & Zeckhauser, 2004; Kramer, 2006).  There may be a number of reasons for the 
change in subsequent trust.  First, the incident of betrayal may make the possibility of 
betrayal salient.  The heightened alertness may lead the participants to be more 
conservative in making another trust decision.  Second, some participants may have over-
generalized the trustworthiness of the people based on the first incident.  Nonetheless, our 
results also suggested that the feeling of shame played a role in the change in subsequent 
trust.  As we predicted, shame was the only negative emotion that significantly associated 
with individuals’ lowering of their subsequent trust after experiencing a betrayal.  
Therefore, the claim that those who experienced shame tend to focus and re-evaluate their 
own value was supported by our results. 
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 The results also confirmed our expectations that not all individuals adjust their 
trust decisions in the same way in the event of betrayal.  We discovered some partial 
evidence showing that individuals’ reasoning with emotions has an impact on the 
relationship between betrayal and the change in subsequent trust.  First, our results 
showed that, after encountering a betrayal, those who scored high in the use of emotions 
tended to be less affected by the betrayal experience, compared to those who scored low 
in the use of emotions.  In other words, the use of emotions attenuated the impact of 
betrayal on subsequent trust.  Second, our results showed that those who scored high in 
neuroticism tended to be more affected by the betrayal experience.  This showed that 
neuroticism exaggerated the impact of betrayal on subsequent trust. 
 Nonetheless, the results concerning individual differences turned out to be more 
complicated than we had expected.  First, the hypotheses relating to the use of emotions 
and neuroticism were significant only with regard to the survey measure of trust, but not 
the behavioral measure of trust.  Second, we had expected that the use of emotions and 
neuroticism would have impact only on the betrayal group.  Nonetheless, Figure 1 and 2 
showed that both of them had impact also on the control group.  We will try to offer some 
explanations to these observations. 
 To a certain extent, the difference in the results between the survey measure of 
trust and the behavarial measure was not surprising since similar difference has been 
found in a couple of empirical studies (Holm & Nystedt, 2008; Ben-Ner & Halldorsson, 
2010).  The explanation to our results could be that the behavioral measure of trust 
includes not only the trust motive but also other motives such as investment motive 
( Schweitzer et al., 2006; Ben-Ner & Halldorsson, 2010).  It is thus possible that some 
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participants rated the target person as trustworthy but decided to pay less amount to her 
because of the fear of loss. 
 The results that the use of emotions and neuroticism had an impact on the control 
group in effect were perplexing.  In the control group, Figure 1 depicted that those who 
scored high in the use of emotions tended to trust the second trustee less than the first 
trustee, whereas those who scored low in the use of emotions did the opposite.  
According to Law et al. (2008), the use of emotion is related to one’s motivation to 
maintain positive affective state.  One possible explanation is that those who scored high 
in the use of emotion tried to maintain their positive affective states by making 
preparation for the potential impact of negative emotions.  In our experiment, the worst 
case is that a participant is being betrayed twice.  Vohs et al. (2007) have reported that 
negative emotions were most frequently found in people who were cheated twice.  
Therefore, the lowering of trust in the second trustee may be a strategy that was used by 
those who scored high in the use of emotion to avoid the potential impact of negative 
emotions.  On the other hand, those who scored low in the use of emotion may simply 
ignored the potential impact of negative emotions in their decision making. 
A similar explanation may also apply to the trend depicted in Figure 2.  In the 
control group, those who scored low in neuroticism tended to trust the second trustee less 
than the first trustee, whereas those who scored high in neuroticism did the opposite.  
Since those who scored low in neuroticism strived to maintain emotionally stable, the 
strategy for making preparation for the worst case may be used by them to avoid 
extremely negative affective-states.   
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It is intriguing to view the whole picture on the impact of the use of emotions and 
neuroticism on trust under both betrayal and control conditions.  In the experiment, the 
first trustee was dishonest whereas the second was honest.   Therefore, those who scored 
low in the use of emotions or high in neuroticism did a better job (i.e. trust the second 
trustee more than the first trustee) in the control group.  Nonetheless, they performed 
worse in the betrayal group.  On the other hand, those who scored high in the use of 
emotions or low in neuroticism, however, did the opposite.  They performed better in the 
betrayal group but worse in the control group.  These results may demonstrate that the 
use of emotions or neuroticism may have either positive or negative impacts on trust, 
depending on circumstances. 
 It was surprising to learn that EI as a whole or emotion regulation did not 
moderate the relationship between betrayal and the change in trust.  We suspect that the 
time factor plays a vital role in the failure.  In the case of Lazare (2004), he felt distraught 
for weeks.  However, in our experiment, participants were asked to make another 
judgment immediately after the result of the first trustee was disclosed.  Although the 
intensity of betrayal should be much stronger in Lazare’s (2004) case than in our 
experiment, the relatively short time-span may not have been sufficient for participants to 
recover from the impact of betrayal. 
Implications 
 The above results imply that inside experiences of betrayal there exists an 
emotional component which may alter one’s subsequent trust decisions.  It seems that 
whether one is active or passive towards emotions could have an impact on how a 
betrayal affects one’s subseqent trust.  An alternative explanation of the results could be 
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that something more fundamental is at work: the implicit theories of emotions.  Tamir, 
John, Srivastava, and Gross (2007) have argued that individuals are different in their 
beliefs about emotions.  Some view emotions as fixed and thus have little incentive to try 
to modify them.  Others, on the other hand, view emotions as malleable and believe that 
they possess the ability to control them.  Individuals who score high in the use of 
emotions may be more likely to view emotions as malleable and controllable and 
manipulate them.  Conversely,  individuals who are high in neuroticism may be more 
likely to view emotions as fixed and not modifiable and thus remain powerless under the 
influence of them.  A previous study has found that people who are high in neuroticism 
are more likely to report that their emotions cannot be changed (Gross & John, 1998).   
4.2 Limitations 
 Although our results indicated that shame associated with the decision on whether 
one will adjust one’s subsequent trust in stranger, they could not explain why some 
people were more vulnerable than others to feeling shame after an experience of betrayal.  
This could be related to one’s motivation to protect one’s self-image from failure and 
regret (Larrick, 1993).  Those who are too obsessive about their own images may find it 
hard to accept that they are ‘suckers’.  It follows that not to be cheated again may become 
their top priorty in the next similar encounter.  In other words, the satisfaction derived 
from not being cheated again far outweighs the dissatisfaction derived from the missed 
opportunity to gain from trusting.  As a result, these people tend to change their 
subsequent trust approach.  
4.3 Future Research 
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 Future studies may be needed to find out the role of EI in the relationship between 
betrayal and subsequent recovery.  We propose that the time factor plays an important 
role for recovery and those who score high in EI may recover from a betrayal faster than 
those who score low.  On the other hand, it may also be fruitful to investigate whether the 
implicit theories of emotion work as we have proposed when one faces betrayal.   
Conclusions 
This article shows that negative emotions accompany a betrayal.  It also shows that an 
incident of betrayal may substantially alter a person’s subsequent trust decisions.  In 
addition, we show that the feeling of shame is linked to a person’s adoption of a more 
conservative stance in his or her subsequent trust.  Although there is some evidence 
showing that EI has the atteunation effect and neuroticism has the exaggeration effect on 
subsequent trust after betrayal, the mechanism is more complicated than we have 
expected.  First, the effects seem to apply only to the trust-rating but not to the amount-
sent.  Second, there exist also unpredicted effects  on subsequent trust-rating under the 
control condition.  Nevertheless, this paper shows that individual difference in handling 
emotions does have an impact on trust modified by betrayal, even though the exact 
mechanism may need further investigation. 
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Table 1 
Participants’ Change in Trust from the First to the Second Trust Game (In Percentage) 
 Betrayal Group Control Group 
Trust Rating   
Decrease from the First to the Second Game 42.5% 18.6% 
Same in both Games 57.5% 69.8% 
Increase from the First to the Second Game 0% 11.6% 
   
Amount Sent   
Decrease from the First to the Second Game 37.5% 14.0% 
Same in both Games 62.5% 79.1% 
Increase from the First to the Second Game 0% 7.0% 
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Figure 1 The Impact of the Use-of-emotions on the Change in Trust-rating across Two 
Groups 
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Figure 2 The Impact Neuroticism on the Change in Trust-rating across Two Groups 
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